Sensitivity of Vapor Cloud Explosion Exceedance Analysis to the Ignition Probability Model for Offshore Process Systems by Mortazavi, Maryam et al.
13th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP13 
Seoul, South Korea, May 26-30, 2019 
 1 
Sensitivity of Vapor Cloud Explosion Exceedance Analysis to the 
Ignition Probability Model for Offshore Process Systems 
 
Maryam Mortazavi 
Department of Civil Engineering, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, 44122 
YeongAe Heo* 
Department of Civil Engineering, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, 44122 
Abdullahi Salman 
Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, The University of Alabama in Huntsville, Huntsville, 
AL 35899, USA 
* Corresponding Author. Tel: 216-368-0455; E-mail: yaheo@case.edu 
ABSTRACT: Probabilistic methodologies have been strictly recommended in the offshore field since 
the worst offshore explosion disaster in terms of lives lost in the North Sea in 1988. For today’s offshore 
projects, essential design specifications including design loads for critical hazardous events are produced 
by quantitative risk analysis (QRA), which substantially governs the success of offshore projects. The 
offshore topside process systems are most vulnerable to hydrocarbon-relevant disasters such as vapor 
cloud explosion (VCE) and fire. However, it still remains extremely challenging to properly predict and 
mitigate the risk of such complex offshore topside systems, due to the nature of complexity in the system 
in addition to harsh environmental and operating conditions. Therefore, this study aims to advance the 
understanding of uncertainties and risk in the complex offshore systems exposed to multiple interrelated 
natural and man-made hazards (i.e. winds, VCEs). This study investigates the effects of uncertainties on 
the risk quantification focusing on VCE risk and ignition probability models, which has not been studied 
yet. A detailed probabilistic risk quantification of VCE is performed for a specific offshore topside 




Historic offshore disasters such as 1988 Piper 
alpha (Paté‐Cornell, 1993) have given rise to 
design paradigm shift to probabilistic risk-based 
approaches in the offshore engineering field. 
Accordingly, quantitative risk assessment (QRA) 
has been widely adopted to estimate design loads 
for critical accidental hazards induced by 
hydrocarbon release such as fires and explosions 
as well as non-hydrocarbon hazards such as 
dropped-object impact, collisions, etc. As vapor 
cloud explosion (VCE) is the most devastating 
hazard which can lead to catastrophic damage to 
human life, economy, and environments, it is 
essential to include in the QRA report for all 
offshore projects. However, existing guidelines 
(Norosk Standard Z-013, 2010) for vapor cloud 
explosion risk assessment (ERA) have been rarely 
examined yet.  
For probabilistic risk-based structural design, 
it is essential to identify dominant scenario 
parameters for a specific hazard as these 
parameters determine the total number of 
scenarios, and design loads are determined by an 
exceedance curve or hazard curve generated using 
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these scenarios. Heo (2013) describes VCE 
scenario parameters with respect to wind, leak, 
and ignition conditions to quantify the annual rate 
of occurrence for ith explosion scenario (𝑃"# ) as 
shown in Eq. (1)  for ERA: 
𝑃"# = 𝜆&# 	. 𝑃)# 	. 𝑃&&# .		𝑃&*# . 
	𝑃+,# . 𝑃+*# . 𝑃-&# . 𝑃-.# . 𝑃-/#             (1) 
where 𝜆&#  is annual leak frequency and  𝑃)# , 𝑃&&# , 
𝑃&*# , 𝑃+,# , 𝑃+*# , 𝑃-&# , 𝑃-.# ,  𝑃-/#  are the probability 
of hole size, leak location, leak direction, wind 
speed, wind direction, ignition time, and ignition 
of FPSO for the ith scenario respectively. This 
explosion probability highly depends on 
numerical assumptions for these scenario 
parameters (e.g. probability distribution functions 
and the interval length of each scenario 
parameter). For each explosion scenario, three-
dimensional computational fluids dynamic (CFD) 
analyses are carried out to generate a flammable 
gas cloud by a dispersion analysis based on the 
selected leak and wind conditions. Subsequently 
explosion analysis is performed to compute 
explosion responses (e.g. pressure time series, 
temperatures, etc.) given the flammable gas cloud 
volume computed by the dispersion analysis and 
the selected ignition conditions (i.e. the ignition 
time and location). The VCE exceedance curve, 
also known as VCE hazard curve, can then be 
plotted using the computed annual probability of 
exceedance versus the explosion pressure. The 
VCE design load can be finally determined by 
reading off the explosion pressure at the allowable 
annual occurrence rate or return period of 10-4 or 
10-5 for accidental actions according to the 
international standards (ISO 19901-3, 2010). 
Since the design load is directly related to the 
explosion scenario parameters, the selection of 
ERA scenarios can lead to serious impact on 
offshore installations.  
Heo and Lee (2017) investigated the effects 
of scenario selection on the ERA results and 
corresponding VCE design loads by different 
sample sizes of leak and wind variables. 5 
different explosion scenario sets were selected to 
generate exceedance curves. It is demonstrated 
that different sample sizes of leak and wind 
variables result in a significant divergence in 
design load estimation for an FPSO. Explosion 
responses greatly vary due to the ignition 
parameters such as ignition time, and locations 
which are related to the size of flammable gas 
clouds and the intensity of explosion pressures. In 
addition, the probability that a gas cloud ignites is 
another vital parameter in ERA. Although there 
are a few existing IP models (Cox et al., 1990; 
CMPT, 1999; UKOOA, 2006; Scandpower, 2007; 
Mossemiller, 2011), it is quite challenging to 
develop a reliable IP model due to its complex 
nature, large aleatory uncertainties and limited 
data (e.g. ignition sources, ignition counts per 
source, etc.). Since a few existing IP models have 
been developed based on such limited data 
combining experts’ judgment and numerical 
analysis, it is obvious that large epistemic 
uncertainties are included in the IP models. These 
ignition variables and its effects on the ERA 
results, however, have not been properly 
examined yet. Specifically, the IP model which is 
essential for the ERA is not a simple parameter, 
but it requires extensive resources and 
multidisciplinary efforts to develop. Accordingly, 
these models have been widely adopted for ERA 
with lack of understanding of the limitations and 
uncertainties in the model. Therefore, in this 
study, two IP models which are most widely used 
in the offshore field are selectively examined to 
demonstrate the sensitivity of the probabilistic 
estimation of VCE design loads to the IP model 
for a specific FPSO.  A total 64 VCE scenarios is 
considered with combination of scenario 
parameters. CFD analysis is performed for 
dispersion and explosion analysis using FLACS 
software package. The exceedance VCE curve is 
plotted for the two IP models. The VCE design 
load obtained from the two IP models is compared 
by reading off the explosion pressure at the 
allowable annual occurrence rate of 10-4. 
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2. SYSTEM DETAILS AND VCE 
SCENARIOS 
2.1. System Details 
The topside of the FPSO is functionally laid out, 
consisting of accommodation, process, and utility 
areas. The areas containing hydrocarbons such as 
the process area are typically equipped by safety 
devices such as blast and fire walls, emergency 
shutdown valves, firefighting systems, and 
various detectors and sensors to prevent 
escalating fires and explosions. In line with this 
safety context, these areas are also designed to be 
segmented by the emergency shutdown valves so 
that each sementation is isolated in case of 
accidental operation conditions. Hence, an 
inventory analysis was carried out for a testbed 
FPSO prior to this study to list equipment such as 
pipes, tanks, and pumps within each isolable 
section and to estimate the amount of 
hydrocarbons which will be trapped within the 
section. Two isolable sections denoted as Sections 
5 and 11 are considered to determine leak 
variables for this study. 
2.2. VCE Scenarios 
2.2.1. Leak Frequencies: 𝜆& 
The calculated annual leak frequencies at Sections 
5 and 11 are 0.049 and 0.028 respectively. 
Equipment-wise leak incident statistics for 
offshore installations of the Hydrocarbon Release 
(HCR) Database (Hydrocarbon Release System, 
1992~2012) are used to calculate the leak 
frequencies of the isolable sections.  
2.2.2. Leak Scenario Parameters: 𝑃&&, 𝑃&*, 𝑃) 
The volume of a flammable gas cloud results from 
leak location, direction, and rate. The locations of 
two isolable sections are considered the leak 
location. For leak direction as shown in Figure 1, 
0º and 180º are considered along the length of the 
FPSO. The leak rate is determined by the hole size 
given the stream properties, pressure and 
temperature in the isolable section as shown in the 
following equations (CMPT, 1999): 




 𝑄0 = 𝐶𝐷	𝐴	𝑃0	𝑍 (3) 







where 𝑄 is the reduced release rate after isolation 
(kg/s), 𝑄0 is the initial release rate (kg/s), 𝑚𝐺 is 
the mass of gas, 𝐶𝐷 is a discharge coefficient, A is 
the hole area (m2), 𝑃0 is the initial pressure of gas 
(N/m2), 𝑀  is the molecular weight of gas, 𝛾  is 
ratio of specific heat, 𝑅  is the universal gas 
constant, and 𝑇0 is the initial temperature of gas. 
150mm of the hole size is used to calculate initial 
leak rates for the two sections as shown in Table 
1. 
 
Figure 1: Process area with schematic scenario 
parameters for leak location, direction and wind 
direction. 
 
Table 1: Initial leak rates for the sections 
 Section 5 Section 11 
Initial release 
rate (kg/s) 39.7 400.9 
2.2.3. Wind Scenario Parameters: PWS, PWD 
The wind plays a critical role to mix the released 
hydrocarbons with the air and disperse the gas 
mixture with various gas concentration ratio. Two 
wind directions, 0º and 15º and two wind 
velocities of 2.5m/s and 7.5 m/s are considered. 
According to the heading analysis and metocean 
analysis for the FPSO, the wind direction of 15 º 
is the largest deviation of the wind during the 
weather vanning while 2.5m/s and 7.5m/s are 
classified as low and medium wind speeds 
respectively.   
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2.2.4. Ignition Scenario Parameters: PIL, PIT, 
PIG 
Not only leak variables, but also ignition time is 
another factor to determine the volume of a 
flammable gas cloud as it explodes as soon as 
ignition occurs no matter how much the total 
inventory volume of an isolable section is to be 
released out. Besides, explosion responses 
considerably vary for different ignition location 
within a flammable gas cloud due to the various 
gas concentration ratio. 60% and 100% of the 
maximum flammable gas cloud volumes are 
considered which represent two different ignition 
times. Also, the upper and lower flammable limit 
zones are considered for two different ignition 
locations at each gas cloud. Combination of these 
selected samples of each random variable result in 
the total number of 64 VCE scenarios. Table 2 
shows the values of scenario parameter. 
 
Table 2: Sample values for the scenario parameters 
Scenario parameter Sample values 
Leak location Section 5 Section 11 
Leak direction 0º 180º 
Leak hole size 150mm 
Wind direction 0 180 
Wind speed 2.5m/s 7.5m/s 
Ignition time at 60% of 𝑉V&WC9XY * 
at 100% of  
𝑉V&WC9XY * 
Ignition location UFL LFL 
* maximum flammable gas cloud volumes 
3. IGNITION PROBABILITY MODELS 
One of the major uncertainties in QRA of offshore 
installations is the probability of ignition. Sources 
of uncertainties in ignition probabilities originate 
from both methodology and data. Over the years, 
several ignition probability models have been 
proposed. The IP models range from simple 
models based on a few key factors such as release 
rate to more complex models that attempt to 
consider as many relevant factors as possible.  
Ignition can be categorized into immediate or 
delayed ignition. Immediate ignition occurs at or 
near the point of release and it is quick enough to 
prevent the formation of a vapor cloud. It can 
occur as a result of released material being above 
its auto-ignition temperature or where the source 
of the leak and ignition are the same.  On the other 
hand, delayed ignition occurs after the formation 
of a vapor cloud. Immediate ignition of gases 
usually results in jet fires while delayed ignition 
can result in either an explosion or a vapor cloud 
fire. Figure 2 demonstrates the possible outcomes 
of ignition using an event tree. Despite the 
importance of immediate and delayed ignition in 
possible outcomes, only a few of the available IP 
models distinguish between them. 
 
 
Figure 2: Event tree for possible outcomes of ignition 
 
Among several existing IP models, two 
commonly used IP models are adopted in this 
study to evaluate the effect of ignition models on 
the overall risk.  
3.1. IP model 1: CMPT Model (1999) 
The model was developed based on historical data 
and expert judgment by Spouge (1999) in the 
Centre for Marine and Petroleum Technology 
(CMPT) within a contract by Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV) Technica for offshore installations. It 
provides a generic ignition probability based on 
the release type (gas or oil) and release rate (kg/s). 
The model does not differentiate between 
immediate and delayed ignition, but it provides 
judgmental values for ignition delay probabilities 
at different time intervals. It is reported that the 
delayed probabilities agree reasonably well with 
historical blowout data but are not consistent with 
process leak data (Spouge, 1999). Therefore, the 
ignition delay probabilities should be further 
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investigated. Table 3 and Table 4 show the 
ignition probabilities of the CMPT model 
(Spouge, 1999).    
 





Probability of ignition 
Gas Oil 
Tiny < 0.5 0.005 0.03 
Small 0.5 – 5 0.04 0.04 
Medium 5 – 25 0.10 0.06 
Large 25 – 200 0.30 0.08 
Massive > 200 0.50 0.10 
 
Table 4: Ignition delay probabilities 
Time interval 
(mins) 
Probability    
of ignition  
in interval 
Probability    
of ignition by 
end of interval 
0 (immediate) 0.10 0.10 
0 – 5  0.20 0.30 
5 – 20  0.37 0.67 
20 – 60  0.29 0.96 
> 60 0.04 1.00 
 
To calculate the probability of ignition for 
each VCE scenario, the values of generic ignition 
probabilities in Table 3 are used based on the leak 
rate categories. The delayed ignition probabilities 
are not used in this study due to inconsistency 
with process data leak data, which is the scope of 
this study. 
3.2. IP model 2: UKOOA Look-Up Correlation 
Model (2006) 
The UKOOA look-up correlation model was 
developed by Energy Institute (EI, 2006) and is 
the most widely used model in recent years 
applicable to both offshore and onshore 
installations. In Phase 1 of the EI study, a full 
model was developed that considers types of 
plants, released material properties, process 
conditions, ignition source characteristics, and 
ignition characteristics of immediate and adjacent 
plant areas. The UKOOA full model is 
cumbersome for QRA. Therefore, a simple look-
up correlation model for application in QRA was 
developed. The look-up correlation model was 
developed by selecting suitable best-fit lines to 
results obtained by running the full UKOOA 
model. Hence, the look-up model is more versatile 
compared to other simpler and more general 
models. The look-up tables are based on three 
parameters: release type (gas, LPG, liquid), 
release rate, and type of installation. There are 
totally 27 scenarios, which take a variety of 
offshore and onshore facilities into account. The 
UKOOA look-up model provides overall ignition 
probability and does not explicitly differentiate 
immediate and delayed ignition.  
In this study, the look-up correlation tables 
will be used for the QRA. The look-up 
correlations consist of up to three gradients with 
the form given by Eq. (5):  
 logI1(𝑦) = 𝑚 ∙ logI1(𝑥) + 𝑐	 (5) 
where y is the ignition probability, x is the mass 
release rate (kg/s), 𝑚  is the ‘gradient’ of the 
correlation, and c is the y-axis ‘offset’ of the 
correlation. The look-up tables provide the 
maximum and minimum ignition probabilities, 
gradient (m) and offset (c) for all ignition 
scenarios considered. For an offshore FPSO 
(Gas), scenario no. 24 can be used to satisfy the 
release type and installation type. The look-up 
correlation characteristics of scenario no. 24 are 
shown in Table 5 (EI, 2006). The minimum and 
maximum ignition probabilities for this scenario 
are 0.001 and 0.15.  
Table 5: Look-up correlation characteristics of 
offshore FPSO (gas) 
Points Leak rate grad offset 
a 0.1 0.073 -2.89 
b 1 1.214 -2.89 
c 50 NA NA 
Note: NA means “Not applicable”. 
To calculate the ignition probabilities, the 
release rate of VCE scenarios are required in the 
UKOOA IP model. Figure 3 shows the ignition 
probabilities proposed by the two IP models 
versus leak rate. As shown in the figure, the 
CMPT model proposes higher ignition probability 
values.  
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Figure 3: Comparison of IP models 
4. EFFECTS ON VCE DESIGN LOAD 
Regulatory guidelines such as the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) guideline suggests a 
maximum annual probability of 10-4 for the cut-
off risk criterion for design purposes. Therefore, 
the design load for VCE overpressure can be 
specified by reading off the annual exceedance 
probability of 10-4 from the exceedance curve. 
Figure 4 shows the overpressure exceedance 
curve for the two IP models.  As shown in Figure 
4, the obtained design overpressure is 
approximately 2.3 bar and 3.7 bar for the UKOOA 
look-up model and the CMPT model, 
respectively. The design overpressure using the 
CMPT ignition model is 61% higher than the 
pressure using the UKOOA look-up model. This 
large discrepancy clearly shows the effect of 
selecting an IP model in the probabilistic risk-
based design of offshore structures. This 
discrepancy in design overpressure can change 
the structural design of offshore platforms 
dramatically, which are supposed to resist blast 
load. 
 
Figure 4: Overpressure exceedance curve 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study demonstrates how much selecting an 
IP model affects estimating design explosion 
loads. Given the same VCE scenarios (64 
scenarios in total) for a specific offshore process 
system, exceedance analysis results using two 
different IP models are compared. While both IP 
models developed by CMPT and UKOOA are 
based on hydrocarbon release rates, large 
discrepancies in the ignition probability of these 
two models are observed for small  (less than 10 
kg/s) and large (greater than 100 kg/s) release 
rates in particular as shown in Figure 3. Since the 
CMPT IP model is more conservative than the 
UKOOA IP model, the VCE design load obtained 
from the probabilistic exceedance analysis using 
the CMPT IP model is more than 60 % larger than 
the UKOOA IP model as shown in Figure 4. As a 
1 bar increase in the VCE design load leads to 
tremendous construction cost rising, further 
investigation of existing IP models is necessary to 
enhance risk-based blast resistance design 
guidelines.  
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